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The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer 
Financial Protection and Systemic Risk 
Erik F. Gerding 
This Article argues that the current global financial crisis, which was 
first called the “subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit the divi-
sion between financial regulations designed to protect consumers from ex-
cessively risky loans and safety-and-soundness regulations intended to pro-
tect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions.  Consumer 
financial protection can, and must, serve a role not only in protecting indi-
viduals from excessive risk, but also in protecting markets from systemic 
risk.  Economic studies indicate it is not merely high rates of defaults on 
consumer loans, but also unpredictable and highly correlated defaults that 
create risks for both lenders and investors in asset-backed securities.  
Consumer financial regulations can mitigate these risks in three, non-
exclusive ways: (1) by reducing the level of defaults on consumer loans, (2) 
by making defaults more predictable, and (3) by reducing the correlation of 
defaults.  The Article argues that: 
  “predatory lending” can constitute a collective action failure by 
lenders; 
  consumer behavioral biases may frustrate predictions of consum-
er defaults; but    
  consumer financial rules that take into account these biases and 
address the “menu design” of consumer loan choices may not on-
ly protect consumers, but make the risk of consumer defaults 
more predictable. 
The Article also draws tentative conclusions on the implications of the 
link between consumer protection and systemic risk for the institutional 
reform of financial regulation by:  
  arguing against federal preemption of state consumer regulation; 
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providing a rough analysis of regulatory reform proposals for creating 
either a single financial regulator or a “Twin Peaks” model of separate 
regulators for consumer protection and systemic risk regulation.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There has been a historical division in financial regulation between 
regulations designed to protect consumers and regulations intended to pro-
tect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions.  This Ar-
ticle argues that the current global financial crisis, which was first called the 
“subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit this division.  More par-
ticularly, this Article argues that consumer financial protection can, and 
must, serve a role not only in protecting individuals from excessive risk, but 
also in protecting markets from systemic risk.  This additional role for con-
sumer financial protection provides novel support for promoting vigorous 
and diverse consumer regulations. 
This Article defines consumer financial protection laws and regula-
tions as legal rules designed to prevent individual borrowers from taking on 
excessive risk.1  These rules address lending practices that are sometimes 
labeled as unfair, abusive, or predatory, and are often justified on efficiency 
grounds.2  For example, consumer financial protection laws may address 
information asymmetries that prevent consumers from understanding the 
risk of a particular loan3 or behavioral biases and cognitive limitations that 
cause consumers to act against their long-term self interest.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8-
11 (2008) (proposing new financial regulator to protect consumers from risk posed by credit products).  
Consumer financial law covers a broad range of concerns, many of which lie beyond the scope of this 
Article.  For example, this Article does not address financial laws or regulations intended to:  
  ensure wide consumer access to credit (including regulations that combat racial discrimination 
by lenders in denying credit to consumers  and regulations that address private credit reports on 
consumers); 
  govern consumer banking and payment transactions; 
  address debt collection or foreclosure practices; or 
  regulate consumer bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, lender practices in these areas might also contribute to the phenomenon that is the 
subject of this Article– excessive consumer defaults that threaten the solvency of financial institutions.  
More particularly, this Article focuses on consumer credit products and consumer lending practices that 
lead to a a high level of market-wide consumer defaults that are both unpredictable and highly corre-
lated.  See infra notes 14, 15, 19, 76-82, Part IV.A.2 and accompanying text. 
 2 See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (arguing that predatory lending 
represents a market failure).   
 3 E.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 4 (arguing that market for consumer credit fails when 
consumers are not optimally informed); Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole 
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As Part II.B explains, a separate set of financial laws and regulations 
address systemic risk.  Scholars have defined systemic risk as the risk of 
market-wide losses or the breakdown of financial markets.5  Because sys-
temic risk threatens the entire market, diversification does not adequately 
protect investors.6  To address systemic risk, financial regulations focus on 
the “safety and soundness” of financial institutions.7  By ensuring the finan-
cial health of institutions, systemic risk regulations attempt to protect finan-
cial markets from the collapse of a significant institution.8  
There is a tension between the objectives of protecting consumers and 
ensuring the financial health of individual financial institutions.  As Profes-
sor Adam Levitin notes, lending practices that extract additional value from 
consumers strengthen the balance sheets of lenders.9  This means that ef-
forts to clamp down on lending practices to protect consumers could ad-
versely impact the finances of financial institutions.  
However, there is little empirical evidence that consumer protection 
efforts have ever threatened the stability of a financial institution to a de-
gree that increases systemic risk.  In fact, this Article argues that consumer 
financial protection is not antithetical to, but, in fact, represents a critical 
tool in mitigating systemic risk.  When widespread consumer credit prod-
ucts or lending practices induce high levels of consumer default, the safety 
and soundness of financial institutions can be threatened.10  Systemic risk 
can thus arise when losses due to consumer defaults threaten either one 
                                                                                                                           
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 
181-82 (2008) (noting that Truth in Lending Act was intended to address information asymmetries that 
prevented consumers from understanding loan terms). 
 4 E.g., Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 754-89 (2006) (using theories from behavioral economics to ex-
plain predatory lending). 
Many consumer financial protection laws are also grounded in paternalism.  Cf. Joshua D. Wright, 
Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 470 (2007) (challenging empirical foundations of behavioral critiques of con-
sumer credit markets).   
 5 George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators 
Retard or Contribute to It, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003) (defining systemic risk as “the risk of a break-
down in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components”).  See also 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193 (2008).  
 6 Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 200.    
 7 See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 967 (2007) (equating concerns in banking law with the “safety and soundness” of 
banks with efforts to mitigate systemic risk). 
 8 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 372, 385 (discussing regulations designed to prevent domi-
no chain failures of financial institutions). 
 9 Adam Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. REG. __ 
(forthcoming 2009). 
 10 Professor Levitin recognizes this potential confluence.  Id.  
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important financial institution (and that failure, in turn, threatens other insti-
tutions) or a number of institutions simultaneously.11   
These two pathways to systemic risk point to a need for a refined un-
derstanding of when consumer default can lead to market-wide losses; it is 
not merely a high incidence of consumer default that poses systemic risk.  
Instead, systemic risk becomes a problem when the level of losses from 
consumer default exceeds the predictions of financial institutions and when 
these consumer defaults are highly correlated.  If financial institutions un-
derestimate consumer defaults, they cannot manage risk effectively.12  
Without accurate predictions of losses from consumer defaults, financial 
institutions cannot make appropriate decisions to make consumer loans or 
charge appropriate interest rates to cover the risk of losses.13  Risk manage-
ment is similarly frustrated by highly correlated consumer defaults; high 
correlation of defaults on loans in a financial institution’s portfolio under-
mines diversification as defaulting loans are not offset by loans that contin-
ue to repay.14  High correlation of defaults across a market means that mul-
tiple financial institutions face losses at the same time.15   
                                                                                                                           
 11 These two potential links between consumer default and systemic risk correspond with two of 
the pathways for systemic risk described by Professors Kaufman and Scott.  These scholars describe 
three ways that systemic risk can arise, including the following:  
1. a failure of one important institution leading to a chain reaction of failures by other inter-
connected institutions; and  
2. failures by multiple institutions that arise from an external “shock” and “similarities in third-
party risk exposures” among those institutions.  Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 372-73. 
 12 If a financial institution could adequately measure the risks posed by consumer defaults either 
directly to the institution itself or indirectly to the institution’s counterparties, then the institution could 
hedge appropriately.  See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial 
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127(2009) (analyzing 
challenges faced by financial institution risk models in measuring impact of defaults on underlying 
mortgages on asset-backed securities). 
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-
Mortgage Financial Crisis 16 (Nov. 2008) (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
Bonn 2008/43), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309442. See also 
Adrian M. Cowan & Charles D. Cowan, Default Correlation: an Empirical Investigation of a Subprime 
Lender, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 753, 765 (2004) (finding high default correlation within subgroups of the 
portfolio of single subprime lender studied).  
 15 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 373 (describing systemic risk arising from financial 
institutions with correlated exposures to third-party defaults). Cf. Mark Carey, Dimensions of Credit 
Risk and their Relationship to Economic Capital Requirements, PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT 
WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001) (detailing how errors in assumption on 
credit risk correlations in financial risk models that would be used to set regulatory capital under Basel 
Accords may lead to significant errors).  
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The systemic risk dangers of unpredicted and highly correlated con-
sumer defaults on loans increase when those loans are securitized.16  Errors 
in calculating the risk of consumer defaults on loans translate into larger 
errors in calculating losses on asset-backed securities backed by those 
loans. 17  Increased correlations on losses in underlying assets also lead to 
higher volatility in asset-backed securities.18  Thus, a financial institution 
that has significant holdings of asset-backed securities backed by consumer 
loans may suffer severe losses when losses on those underlying loans are 
high, unpredicted, and highly correlated.  When several significant financial 
institutions have high exposure to these asset-backed securities and, by ex-
tension, consumer loans, these institutions may suffer significant losses 
simultaneously.19  
This causal chain that links consumer defaults with systemic risk is un-
fortunately not just theoretical.  The current financial crisis, which started 
with subprime mortgages and spread to financial institutions that held se-
curities backed by those mortgages,20 provides stark evidence of the link 
between consumer defaults and threats to entire financial markets.  This 
article argues that consumer defaults on mortgages became excessive, un-
predictable, and highly correlated in large part due to the failure of consum-
er protection laws.  In the years leading up to the crisis, consumer lenders 
increasingly offered mortgages and other credit products and engaged in 
lending practices that passed excessive risk to consumers and increased the 
probability of widespread consumer default.21  Systemic risk increased not 
merely because certain types of subprime mortgage passed excessive risk to 
borrowers, but, moreover, because many different lenders began offering 
these same type of mortgages at the same time en masse.  Increasing homo-
                                                                                                                           
 16 Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2009) 
(describing how correlation among losses on underlying assets undermines efficient risk spreading in 
securitization and can lead to severe errors in estimating losses on asset-backed securities); Eva Porras, 
The Role of Correlation in the Current Credit Ratings Squeeze (IE Business School, Working Paper 
WP08-10(2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134488 (analyzing 
the role of default correlations in subprime portfolios in a wave of ratings downgrades of asset-backed 
securities in current crisis).   
 17 Coval et al., supra note 16.   
 18 Id.  See also Gerding, supra note 12. 
 19 Cf. Rob Nijskens & Wolf Wagner, Credit Risk Transfer Activities and Systemic Risk: How 
Banks Became Less Risky Individually but Posed Greater Risks to the Financial System at the Same 
 Time (Dec. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=1319689 (positing that credit risk transfers by financial institutions, including via securitiza-
tion, counterintuitively may increase systemic risk by making bank risk profiles more correlated with 
one another).   
 20 See infra Part III (providing a thumbnail sketch of the beginnings of the current global financial 
crisis in the subprime mortgage market).   
 21 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.  
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geneity or synchronization of lender behavior that passed on more risk to 
consumers dramatically increased systemic risk.  Just before the crisis, U.S. 
bank regulators began to recognize the possible risks posed by subprime 
lending and securitization to the safety and soundness of financial institu-
tions,22 but the severity of the financial crisis shows that regulators need to 
move beyond baby steps and redouble efforts to address systemic risk 
through consumer protection. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II sketches the basic division in 
U.S. financial regulation between laws designed to protect consumers and 
those designed to mitigate systemic risk; Part III describes the rise of sub-
prime lending, particularly subprime mortgage lending,23 and how the secu-
ritization fueled that rise;24 Part III also underscores the risks posed by un-
predictable and highly correlated consumer defaults in subprime markets 
and also provides a brief explanation of how the financial crisis started with 
defaults in subprime mortgages and spread to financial institutions.  Part IV 
describes how two market imperfections – a collective action failure by 
lenders and consumer behavioral biases – contribute to making consumer 
defaults unpredictable and highly correlated and exacerbate systemic risk; 
Part V argues that the current financial crisis demonstrates the need to enlist 
consumer financial protection in efforts to mitigate systemic risk and that 
policies based on improving the “menu design” of consumer borrowing 
options can prove particularly valuable in fighting systemic risk; Part VI 
analyzes the implications of employing consumer financial protection law 
as a tool to mitigate systemic risk for the current debate over reorganizing 
financial regulators; and Part VII concludes. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 1290-91.  As Professors Engel and McCoy note, “In 
January 2001, federal banking regulators increased the capital requirements for all institutions with 
subprime lending programs that equaled or exceeded 25% of their tier one regulatory capital.” Id. at 
1291, n.155. (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ET AL., EXPANDED 
GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 2, 5-6 (2001)).  However, it is unclear how diligently 
bank examiners followed this examination guidance.   
Professors McCoy and Engel also note that regulators proposed several rules that would require 
subprime lenders to collect data on their loans or mortgages.  Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 1291, 
n.155.  Finally, bank regulators issued inter-agency guidance on capital requirements for financial insti-
tutions to cover risks posed by asset-backed securities held by those institutions.  Id. (citing Federal 
Reserve System, Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, Capital Adequacy Guidelines, Capital Maintenance, 
Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations, 
66 Fed. Reg. 59, 614 (Nov. 29, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225). 
 23 See infra Part III.A.  
 24 See infra Parts III.B (describing the mechanics of securitization) and III.C (describing how 
securitization fueled subprime lending).    
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II.  THE DIVIDE BETWEEN CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND 
REGULATIONS ON SYSTEMIC RISK 
The current structure of financial regulation treats the protection of 
consumers from unfair lending practices and the protection of financial 
markets from systemic risk as two distinct objectives.  This division appears 
both in different statutory and regulatory frameworks and in the allocation 
of responsibility among and within different financial regulators.  The fol-
lowing paragraphs provide just a sketch of this division. 
A.  Consumer Protection 
An array of federal and state laws addresses protecting consumer bor-
rowers from abusive, unfair or predatory lending practices.  A basic distinc-
tion can be made between laws that regulate the substance of consumer loan 
terms and those that require that lenders make certain disclosure to con-
sumers.  Substantive regulation of consumers has its origins in usury sta-
tutes, which survive in state law.25  Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these 
usury statutes has been dramatically undermined in the last 30 years due to 
two factors.  First, the Supreme Court’s decision in Marquette National 
Bank26 permitted national banks to export the usury law of the states in 
which they are located.27  This decision encouraged both lenders to relocate 
to states with higher or no interest rate ceilings and states to dilute their 
usury laws, phenomena some scholars have described as a “race-to-the bot-
tom.”28  Second, state interest rate caps were preempted by the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act,29 a statute that was 
critical in spurring the growth of subprime lending.30   
                                                                                                                           
 25 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience 
Distortion of American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1116-22 (2008) (surveying histor-
ical development of state usury laws in the United States through the present).  
 26 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
 27 Id. at 318-19.  See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 148 (2004) 
(analyzing how banks have been able to export the usury law of the state in which they are located 
because of Marquette decision).  Professor Barr also notes that regulations of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency that assert federal preemption of state consumer protection laws have built 
on the Marquette decision.  Id. 
 28 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory 
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2005).  See also Elizabeth R. Schlitz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-
Expanding Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 
(2004).   
 29 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 30 Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mort-
gage Market, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 38 (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf.     
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In contrast with the substantive regulation of loans by state usury laws, 
federal consumer financial protection has focused primarily on requiring 
disclosure to consumers of loan terms.  Most notably, the Truth in Lending 
Act31 and related federal regulations32 set forth detailed standards for disclo-
sures by lenders in consumer credit transactions.    
B.  Systemic Risk 
Federal and state regulations of banks and other financial institutions 
address systemic risk by limiting risk-taking by those institutions.  Systemic 
risk regulations include regulations that focus on the “safety and sound-
ness” of banks and other financial institutions (e.g., insurance companies) 
whose collapse may have broad spillover effects on financial markets.33  
These risk regulations fall into several broad categories, including the fol-
lowing: 
 regulations that limit financial institutions to particular lines of 
business to shield them from excessive losses and to allow 
regulators to assess better the risks that the institutions face;34 
 
 restrictions on the types of investments that financial institu-
tions may make, which include prohibitions on investments in 
real estate35 and riskier classes of securities, such as equity;36 
 
   prudential restrictions on the number of loans to certain types 
of borrowers;37 and 
 
 capital requirements for financial institutions.38   
                                                                                                                           
 31 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2008).  
 32 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2008). 
 33 See Feibelman, supra note 7, at 967.  
 34 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (enumerating powers of national banks). 
 35 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 29 (2008) (restricting ability of national banks to invest in real estate).  
 36 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (specifying categories of securities investments which national 
banks are permitted to make). 
 37 For example, federal banking laws limit the loans that banks may have outstanding to one 
borrower.  12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1464(u) (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2008).  Another set of laws restrict a 
bank’s loans to other depositary institutions to prevent the collapse of one institution from threatening 
others.  12 U.S.C. § 371b-2 (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 206 (2008).     
 38 Requiring that institutions maintain a certain amount of capital to match the risks on their 
balance sheet ensures that they have a cushion against losses that would push the institutions towards 
insolvency and threaten their depositors, creditors, and other institutions.  Capital requirements are a 
centerpiece of federal banking regulation.  E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831(o)(c)(1) (requiring federal bank regu-
lators to establish capital requirements for supervised banks). But capital requirements also feature 
regulation of other types of financial institutions.  For example, the SEC imposes capital requirements 
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These regulations are buttressed by the general powers of a regulator 
to inspect financial institutions for safety and soundness39 and to revoke an 
institution’s license, assume control of its operations, or shut it down if the 
regulator finds concerns.40  Deposit insurance and other government guaran-
tees of financial institutions provide other backstops against systemic risk 
by mitigating the threat of bank runs.41  Yet, the moral hazard created by 
this insurance means that the regulators providing the backstop must active-
ly use other regulations to restrict excessive risk-taking.42  Finally, central 
banks attempt to mitigate systemic risk by serving as lenders of last resort.43     
C. When a Regulator Has Both a Consumer Protection and Systemic Risk   
Mission 
A number of banking regulators have both consumer protection and 
systemic risk mitigation (safety and soundness) in their statutory missions.  
But, as Professor Levitin argues, these missions can conflict.   
[T]he safety-and-soundness mission is incompatible with consumer 
protection because practices that might be profitable and thus increase 
banks’ safety-and-soundness might also be abusive and unfair to con-
sumers.  For example, banks might not engage in the most strenuous 
anti-fraud practices because it might not be as profitable as allowing a 
certain level of fraud[.]  Safety-and-soundness and consumer protec-
tion would thus push for different regulatory outcomes.44   
                                                                                                                           
on registered broker-dealers.  Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 
(2009). 
 39 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4517 (2008) (mandating annual examination of government sponsored enti-
ties for safety and soundness).  See also Tamar Frankel, Regulating the Financial Markets by Examina-
tions, (B.U. Sch. L. Working Paper No. 09-09, Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/pa 
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1339913 (arguing that securities regulators should use regulatory examinations 
similar to safety and soundness examinations by federal bank regulators to mitigate the risk of asset 
price bubbles and financial market crashes). 
 40 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (2008) (requiring federal bank regulators to set safety-and-soundness 
standards for insured depositary institutions); § 1818 (setting standards for termination of deposit insur-
ance status); § 1831(o) (setting standards for “prompt corrective action” by insured depositary institu-
tions).  See also Frankel, supra note 39. 
 41 See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 210.  But cf. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 5, at 381 (arguing 
that deposit insurance is unnecessary and counterproductive in mitigating systemic risk). 
 42 RIK W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYLOPEDIA 270-71 (2005) (analyzing 
potential moral hazard created by deposit insurance).   
 43 For an economic analysis of this lender of last resort role and the concept of systemic risk in 
general, see Olivier De Bandt & Phillip Hartmann, Systemic Risk in Banking: A Survey, in FINANCIAL 
CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 249, 260  (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing 
eds., 2002). 
 44 Levitin, supra note 9, at 19.  Professor Levitin explains that the interests of banks and investors 
in preventing fraud may diverge with the following economic analysis:  
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He further argues that, faced with this conflict, bank regulators often 
give priority to protecting against systemic risk. 
Placing the two missions together in a single agency ensures that one 
will trump the other, and historically consumer protection has not won 
out[.]  Federal banking regulators have the authority to regulate for 
consumer protection, but are not motivated to do so, in part because of 
its conflict with their safety-and-soundness mission[.]45 
Professor Levitin acknowledges that there may be an alignment between 
consumer protection and safety-and-soundness missions because excessive 
defaults may threaten financial institutions.46   
Nevertheless, Professor Levitin maintains that the potential conflict 
between the two missions explains why federal bank regulators have either 
refrained from fully enforcing consumer protection laws and regulations in 
their mandate or, in some cases, actively worked to roll back consumer pro-
tection laws.  As an example of a regulator that both failed to enforce and 
actively undermined consumer protection laws, Professor Levitin cites the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).  In particular, he faults 
the Comptroller of the Currency for asserting that federal banking laws 
preempt state consumer financial protections.47  The OCC won a major vic-
tory in its efforts to preempt state consumer regulations in 2007, when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Watters v. Wachovia Bank48 that state regulation of a 
state-chartered mortgage subsidiary of a national bank was preempted by 
the National Bank Act.49  Scholars have echoed Professor Levitin’s analy-
                                                                                                                           
From a bank’s perspective, there is an optimal level of fraud, which is not zero.  After a certain 
point, the cost of preventing the marginal fraud outweighs its benefit.  From a safety-and-
soundness perspective, a bank should not overinvest in anti-fraud security.  But from a consumer 
perspective, the optimal level of fraud is likely zero, especially if consumers bear the risk of fraud 
loss.  Id.     
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at n.58.  Levitin notes, however, that this alignment may no longer exist.  First, banks no 
longer bear the risk of excessive defaults on consumer loans when they sell those loans to securitization 
vehicles.  Second, defaults on some loans, such as credit card debt, generates profits for banks through 
penalties.  Id. (citing Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweatbox” of Credit Card Debt, 
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375). 
 47 See Levitin, supra note 9. 
 48 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007).  
 49 See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of 
State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (2008) (criticizing Watters as part of larger 
legal movement to preempt state banking regulation).  Another important milestone in federal preemp-
tion occurred in 1980 when the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
preempted state interest rate caps; this legislation represented a critical piece in the beginning of the 
subprime mortgage market.  See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of 
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009).  
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sis50 and noted that other federal banking regulators that have both consum-
er protection and safety and soundness missions have emphasized the latter 
mission at the expense of the former.51  
III. SUBPRIME LENDING, SECURITIZATION AND THE START OF THE CRISIS 
A.  The Rise of Subprime Mortgage Lending 
The subprime crisis revealed the dangers in failing to recognize that 
consumer financial protection is a crucial tool in efforts to mitigate system-
ic risk.  As detailed below, the crisis began with consumer defaults on so-
called subprime mortgages.  “Subprime mortgages” can have several defini-
tions, but are often distinguished from “prime” mortgages by significantly 
higher upfront and continuing costs (including fees and interest rate pay-
ments) due to the lower creditworthiness of the borrowers.52  The last fifteen 
years witnessed a boom in subprime mortgage lending.53  
Many of the mortgages offered to subprime borrowers (and offered to 
other borrowers) had complex interest rate features.  A notable category of 
these complex mortgages, adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), offered 
buyers low fixed rates on an introductory or “teaser” basis, with interest 
rates converting to a floating, market-based interest rate after a few years.54  
ARMs and other “exotic” mortgages would cost borrowers substantially 
more over the life of the mortgages than fixed rate mortgages.55  ARMs also 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 90-95.  
 51 Id. at 94-95 (criticizing Federal Reserve’s poor performance in consumer protection due to 
focus on safety and soundness mission); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank 
Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2003) (com-
menting on Federal Reserve prioritizing safety and soundness).   
 52 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 30, at 32.   These costs can be broken down 
as follows: 
Upfront costs include application fees, appraisal fees, and other fees associated with originating a 
mortgage. The continuing costs include mortgage insurance payments, principle and interest pay-
ments, late fees and fines for delinquent payments, and fees levied by a locality (such as property 
taxes and special assessments).  Id. 
Other definitions of subprime loans focus on lower creditworthiness of borrowers as measured by lower 
credit rating scores.  E.g. Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 08-25, 2 
Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1276047.  
 53 See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 30, at 36-40.  
 54 Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 123, 144 (2007).  See also Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime 
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (positing that the two defining features of 
subprime mortgage contracts are cost deferral for borrowers and complexity in terms).  
 55 See Bar-Gill, supra note 54.  The costs to consumers of ARM loans were recognized in legal 
scholarship over two decades ago.  E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The 
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meant that borrowers bore significant interest rate risk; if interest rates in-
creased after the teaser period expired, then the required interest payments 
would rise, potentially beyond the ability of the borrower to repay.56  Rising 
market interest rates would also foreclose the ability of the borrower to re-
finance or sell the house for more than the value of the mortgage (as higher 
interest rates would decrease the number of buyers in the market).57  One 
scholar describes subprime mortgages as having a “binary quality.”  Sub-
prime borrowers could not make payments on ARMs when interest rates 
reset and depended on rising housing prices to be able to obtain cash-out 
refinancing.  But when housing prices stagnated or depreciated or credit 
tightened, these borrowers would default on mortgages in large numbers.58  
The dramatic increase in the lending of these more complex mortgages 
coincided with a boom in other forms of consumer lending, such as credit 
card products, both to subprime borrowers and more creditworthy individu-
als.59  Many of these other credit products also contained complex terms, 
which allowed lenders to reset interest rates or charge various “hidden” fees 
and penalties.60 
Consumer law scholars have argued that mortgage and other consumer 
lenders used the complexity of ARMs and consumer credit products to shift 
interest rate risk to, and extract additional revenue from, consumers.61  
These scholars argued lenders exploited not only informational asymme-
tries, but the behavioral biases of consumers as well.62  Consumers make 
many decisions in a manner inconsistent with the rational actor models of 
neoclassical economics, these scholars contend; instead, consumers exhibit 
cognitive limitations and take mental shortcuts that cause them to miscalcu-
late financial risks.63  According to these scholars, these behavioral biases 
                                                                                                                           
Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale 
and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1131 (1984). 
 56 See Bar-Gill, supra note 54.   
 57 See id.  
 58 Stephen G. Ryan, Accounting in and for the Subprime Crisis, 83 ACCOUNTING REV. 1605 
(2008).  
 59 For a discussion of rising levels of consumer debt, see Teresa A. Sullivan, Less Stigma or More 
Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 213, 229-32 (2006); TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: 
AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000). 
 60 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 26-53 (analyzing market failures in consumer credit 
products other than mortgages). 
 61 See Bar-Gill, supra note 54. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See Willis, supra note 4, at 754-804 (cataloging behavioral biases afflicting mortgage borrow-
ers). 
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caused consumer borrowers to agree to provisions in mortgages and other 
consumer debt contracts that they otherwise might not have.64   
B.  Securitization 
Consumer lending came to have a more direct effect on capital mar-
kets because of the advent of securitization.  Securitization also means that 
risks inherent in consumer lending translate more directly into systemic 
risk.  Securitization represents a process by which loans, mortgages, and 
other credit products that generate predictable future cash streams from 
borrowers are pooled together and sold to an investment vehicle that then 
issues securities to investors.65  The proceeds from the sale of the securities 
fund the purchase of the loan pool by the investment vehicle.66  The asset-
backed securities issued in a securitization are often themselves pooled and 
securitized; this re-securitization of asset-backed securities can and has 
been repeated many times over in an iterative fashion.67  
Lenders benefit from securitization in several ways.  First, they can 
convert long-term assets (such as mortgages) into short-term, extremely 
liquid assets (i.e., cash).  This can help address a mismatch that many lend-
ers face between short-term liabilities and long-term assets, thereby ad-
dressing a concern of both investors and regulators.68  Second, lenders can 
then channel the cash into new loans and increase their returns on capital.69  
Third, lenders can earn fees paid by the investment vehicle for continuing 
to collect and enforce the loans on behalf of the vehicle (“servicing fees”).70  
Fourth, lenders use securitization to mitigate and diversify against credit 
risk.  By selling a portion of the loans they make, the lenders mitigate the 
risk of losses from consumer default on those loans, which risk might be 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Bar-Gill, supra note 54; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1, at 26-53 (analyzing market 
failures in consumer credit products other than mortgages).  For other recent scholarship on the effects 
of behavioral biases on real estate investments, see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1047 (2008); Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money Illusion and Housing Fren-
zies, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 135 (2008).  
 65 For a primer on securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135 (1994).   
 66 See id.  
 67 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 1, 15 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1997); Coval et al., supra note 16 
(describing “CDO Squared” securitizations). 
 68 See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, CORPORATE BONDS AND STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 297-
300 (2004).  
 69 See Simon Wolfe, Structural Effects of Asset-Backed Securitisation, 6 EUR. J. FIN. 353 (2000).  
 70 CHARLES AUSTIN STONE & ANNE ZISSU, THE SECURITIZATION MARKETS HANDBOOK: 
STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS OF MORTGAGE AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 45 (2005).     
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overly concentrated in certain geographic areas or market segments.71  Se-
curitization thus provides a mechanism to spread risks from lenders to in-
vestors; through securitization, lenders offload credit risk from mortgages, 
credit card debts, student loans and other credit products to purchasers of 
asset-backed securities.72     
Investors have been willing to bear these risks because securitization 
offers both the rewards of investing in lucrative consumer credit markets 
and the opportunity to diversify against risks.73  An investor in asset-backed 
securities can diversify against the credit risk of consumer mortgages and 
other loans in three different ways.  First, the pooling of loans means that 
the risk of default on any one loan is offset by the payments on non-
defaulted loans.  Second, securitization facilitates diversification because a 
purchaser of an asset-backed security is only purchasing a piece of the risk 
of the mortgage pool.  An investor can diversify by balancing the other in-
vestments in its portfolio.  Third, and in a related vein, an investor can more 
finely tune the amount of risk in any investment in asset-backed securities 
because these securities are often issued in different classes or tranches.  
Each tranche has a different priority in rights to payments on the underlying 
loans, with senior tranches receiving payments before junior classes are 
paid.  Each tranche of a securitization thus offers a different tradeoff be-
tween risk and interest rates (reward).74 
But, the success of diversification (and the efficiency of risk spreading 
through securitization) rests on several assumptions.  Among these assump-
tions is that the models used to price asset-backed securities adequately 
measure the risks posed by the underlying loans.75  Furthermore, diversifi-
cation depends on a low, constant, and predictable degree of correlation of 
losses on underlying loans.76  Again, diversification depends in part on 
losses from a default on some loans being offset by continued payments on 
other loans.  When defaults are highly correlated, it no longer rains, it 
pours.  High default correlations on the assets underlying a securitization 
can create extreme volatility in the losses to asset-backed securities and 
lead to serious underestimation of the risk of investing in those securities.77  
                                                                                                                           
 71 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 68, at 300.  
 72 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, 
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008) (describing risk spread-
ing functions of CDOs, a type of securitization, and other financial instruments). 
 73 See CHOUDHRY, supra note 68, at 300.  
 74 See Gerding, supra note 12.    
 75 See id.   
 76 See Coval et al., supra note 16.  See also Porras, supra note 16. 
 77 See Coval et al., supra note 16 (detailing how small errors in the assumptions of securitization 
models can lead to large miscalculations of losses for asset-backed securities with these miscalculations 
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Errors in estimating losses and the correlation of losses on underlying loans 
lead to larger errors in estimating losses on asset-backed securities.  If those 
asset-backed securities are then themselves securitized, the original estima-
tion errors on the underlying loans magnify the errors in estimating losses 
on the second layer of securities even more.78 
The risk of high default correlations on underlying assets increases 
when those assets are subprime loans.  Studies have shown that individual 
subprime lenders have high correlations of default in their loan portfolios79 
and that defaults among subprime borrowers are highly correlated (while 
defaults among more creditworthy borrowers have a much lower correla-
tion).80  Thus, securitization of subprime loans increases the risk of errors in 
calculating losses on asset-backed securities.   
Correlation can also defeat diversification across an investor’s portfo-
lio.  When different securities in an investor’s portfolio (for example, dif-
ferent issuances of asset-backed securities) experience high—and highly 
correlated—losses, that investor may lurch towards sudden financial col-
                                                                                                                           
compounded with every re-securitization of those securities); Porras, supra note 16.; Gunter Löffler, The 
Effects of Estimation Error on Measures of Portfolio Credit Risk, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1427 (2003) 
(providing statistical analysis that shows how default correlations can lead to errors in estimating credit 
risk in investment portfolio); cf. Darrell Duffie et al., Frailty Correlated Default (Swiss Fin. Inst.  
Research, Working Paper No. 08-44, 2008), available at http://www.finance.ox.ac.uk/NR/rdonlyres/CF9 
7FD7F-2BFB-41CE-B99A-FF4DE0DEB9BB/0/DarrellDuffie.pdf (finding that standard risk measure-
ment methods severely underestimate probability of default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt, 
including CDOs, because of hidden default correlations). 
 78 See Coval et al., supra note 16. 
 79 Cowan & Cowan, supra note 14 (finding high default correlation in portfolio of single sub-
prime lender studied).   
 80 David K. Musto & Nicholas S. Souleles, A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit, 53 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 59, 61-62 (2006) (positing that measuring default risk of consumer loans requires 
determining covariance with aggregate consumer default rates and finding that “consumers with high 
covariance risk tend to also have low credit scores (high default probabilities)”). 
There are several explanations for this high correlation of default rates for subprime borrowers.  
First, the binary quality of subprime mortgages explained above (supra in note 58 and accompanying 
text) means that when housing prices stagnate or fall and cash-out refinancing is no longer available to 
borrowers, borrowers will default in large numbers.  Second, a default on one subprime mortgage may 
have spillover effects that increase the probability of defaults on other mortgages.  For example, if a 
default leads to a foreclosure, that foreclosure will lower the value of neighboring houses.  A resultant 
reduction in homeowner equity may lead other subprime borrowers to conclude that continuing to pay 
their mortgages is no longer sensible.  See Gerding, supra note 12.  Third, once defaults reach a certain 
level, feedback loops may develop.  For example, a wave of borrower defaults may cause lenders to cut 
back lending, which would increase interest rates, curtail home price appreciation, and cause more 
subprime borrowers to default.  Id.  Finally, this article argues that subprime lenders have increasingly 
extended the same types of high-risk loans and engaged in homogenized or synchronized lending prac-
tices, both of which may increase the correlation of borrower defaults.  See infra notes 121-122 and 
accompanying text.      
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lapse.81  If there is a high degree of correlation among the portfolios of large 
institutional investors, losses in one investment portfolio may presage mar-
ket-wide losses,82 which may cause many investors to sell assets, make 
margin calls, and cut lending simultaneously.  
C.  The Connection between Securitization and Subprime Lending 
Scholars have argued that securitization triggered the growth of sub-
prime mortgage lending (and other subprime consumer loans).83  When 
lenders could sell the mortgages they originated, they no longer bore the 
risk of losses from borrower default and had less incentive to ensure that 
consumers could repay the mortgages.84  Indeed, many mortgage lenders 
lowered underwriting standards and extended so-called low documentation 
(“low doc”) loans that did not require documentary proof of a borrower’s 
employment or other important indicia of creditworthiness.85  Instead of 
ensuring the creditworthiness of borrowers, lenders had an incentive to en-
ter new markets, including the subprime market, to generate additional 
fees.86   
Fueled by securitization, the U.S. subprime mortgage market grew 
from miniscule levels to $625 billion in 2005, when it represented one-fifth 
of total annual mortgage originations.87  Economists have noted that the 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Insurers face a similar problem in ensuring that losses in their portfolio are not highly corre-
lated.  ZVI BODIE ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF INVESTMENTS 196 (Richard D. Irwin, 3d ed., 1998). 
 82 See generally Martin Hellwig, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Sub-
prime-Mortgage Financial Crisis (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Preprint No. 
2008/43, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1309442.  Professor 
Hellwig analyzes in depth how correlations in various levels of a securitization—from default correla-
tions among underlying loans to correlations in prices of asset-backed securities—can undermine diver-
sification, lead to unexpectedly large losses for financial institutions, and thus exacerbate systemic risk.  
He analyzes how these various correlations frustrated risk modeling and contributed to the global finan-
cial crisis. 
 83 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); Christopher A. Peterson, Predatory Structured 
Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185 (2007). 
 84 Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, On “Leveraged 
Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Meltdown,” Remarks at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New 
York, N.Y. (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080 
229a.htm (discussing incentive problems created by “originate-to-distribute” model). 
 85 Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 
1045-46 (2007); Alan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How did it Happen and How will it 
End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 13 (2007) (presenting empirical data on low-documentation loans). 
 86 Engel & McCoy, supra note 83; Bar-Gill, supra note 54.  Benjamin J. Keys, et al., Did Securi-
tization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093137 (concluding securitiza-
tion did lead to deterioration in credit screening). 
 87 Gregory A. Krohn & William R. Gruver, The Complexities of the Financial Turmoil of 2007 
and 2008, at 9 (Oct. 7, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at  
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subprime mortgage market depended heavily on steady increases in home 
values, which enabled mortgage borrowers – who could not afford the 
higher interest rates when their ARM (or other exotic mortgage) reset – to 
either refinance or sell.88  Housing prices did rise fairly sharply from 1999 
to 2005, with the boom in the last several years fueled in particular by sub-
prime lending.89  Demand by investors for mortgage-backed securities 
spurred additional mortgage lending.90  One group of economists describes 
the interplay of securitization and subprime mortgage lending as a feedback 
loop that created a housing bubble.  They write: 
A critical factor in the bubble was the interaction of financial engi-
neering and deteriorating lending standards in real-estate markets, 
which fed on each other to cause unsustainable price rises, and then 
collapse.  Financial market expansion and innovation provided new 
funding sources and a demand for mortgages for securitization. This 
required the easing of lending standards, which drove prices up.  The 
soaring housing prices were both an effect and a cause of too much 
easing as the price rises supported the continued undermining of lend-
ing standards.91 
The rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market coincided with 
consolidation of market share among lenders.92  One study found a correla-
tion in subprime markets between increases in competition among lenders 
                                                                                                                           
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1282250&rec=1&srcabs=1273467).  
 88 Gorton, supra note 52, at 5-6.  See also Michel G. Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 
07 (July 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstact_i 
d=1112467&rec=1&srcabs=1072304). 
 89 Krohn & Gruver, supra note 87.  Some economists see housing price increases as driven by a 
feedback loop that is psychological.  See Robert J. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House 
Prices and Home Ownership (Yale Econ. Dep’t Working Paper No. 28, 2007), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017546 (describing evidence that housing price increase 
stemmed from psychological feedback mechanism; increasing asset prices lured investors and drove a 
speculative bubble). 
 90 Krohn & Gruver, supra note 87 (describing “shadow banking” system of securitization inves-
tors funding and driving subprime mortgage lending by non-banks); Engel & McCoy, supra note 83, at 
137 (citing reports that excess demand by investors for asset-backed securities led to additional sub-
prime securitizations and lax diligence by investors of credit risk).   
 91 Susan M. Wachter et al., Subprime Lending and Real Estate Markets, in MORTGAGE & REAL 
ESTATE FIN. (Stefania Perrucci ed., 2008).  But see Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Where’s the 
Smoking Gun? A Study of Underwriting Standards for US Subprime Mortgages (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2008-036A, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?a 
bstract_id=1286106 (finding no deterioration of lending standards after 2004).  
 92 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 30, at 40.     
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and decreases in underwriting standards.93  As underwriting standards de-
clined, subprime mortgage lenders were increasingly making the same 
types of riskier loans; from 2001 to 2006, the percentage of subprime mort-
gage originations that constituted:  
 Low-documentation (or no-documentation) loans increased 
from 28.5% to 50.8%; 
 ARMs jumped from 73.8% to 91.3%; 
 Interest-only mortgages increased from 0% to 22.8%.94   
These trends coincided with some mortgage originators waiving down 
payment requirements and mortgage borrowers holding lower equity stakes 
in their homes.95 
Together, these trends indicate that lenders were making the same 
types of loans in the same markets and simultaneously lowering underwrit-
ing standards.  This homogenization or synchronization of lending practices 
may explain (or exacerbate) the default correlations that studies have found 
in subprime loan portfolios.96  Again, high default correlations in underlying 
mortgage loans can translate into unexpectedly and significantly higher 
defaults in securities backed by those loans.97 
D.  The Crisis Spreads 
The following paragraphs present merely a thumbnail sketch of the 
crisis to highlight how consumer mortgage defaults threatened the safety of 
financial institutions and created massive systemic risk.  The subprime cri-
sis began in 2007, when defaults on ARMs began rising as teaser rates on 
ARMs expired and many subprime borrowers were unable to make pay-
ments at the higher reset rate.98  Rising market interest rates cut off the exit 
options for borrowers by both making refinancing prohibitively expensive 
and drying up the resale market; home prices began to level or drop in 
many markets after years of continuous gains.99  Waves of defaults by mort-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Giovanni Dell’Ariccia et al., Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Sub-
prime Mortgage Market (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research, Discussion Paper No. DP6683, 2008), available 
at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf08rtmfs/aricciaiganlaeven.pdf.  
 94 Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Law and Economic Issues in Subprime Litigation (Harvard Law 
School, John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_et_al_612.pdf.  
 95 Id.  Crouhy et al., supra note 88. 
 96 See supra notes 14, 79, 82 and accompanying text.  
 97 Supra notes 16-18, 79-82 and accompanying text. 
 98 Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans: A Nightmare Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 
C1.  
 99 Id.; see also Jia Lynn Yang, How Bad is the Mortgage Crisis Going to Get?, CNNMONEY.COM,  
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gage borrowers followed.100  The wave of defaults swelled enough to affect 
even senior classes of mortgage-backed securities.101  Defaults on asset-
backed securities triggered guarantees and credit insurance policies, and 
unprepared guarantors and credit insurers themselves threatened to falter.102      
Growing losses for financial institutions on mortgages and mortgage-
backed securities created two aftershocks.  First, lenders cut back on mort-
gage and other lending, which drove market interest rates higher and started 
a credit crunch.  Higher interest rates created a feedback loop and worsened 
default rates on ARMs.103  Second, the plummeting of the value of asset-
backed securities forced many financial institutions to make substantial 
write-downs of assets on their balance sheets, a process that still contin-
ues.104  Yet the value of many of these assets became extremely uncertain, as 
buyers for asset-backed securities disappeared.105  In addition, the iteration 
of securitization upon securitization meant that the default of one class of 
securitization cascaded and caused losses in subsequent securitizations.  
But, the many layers of securitization – asset-backed securities backed by 
other asset-backed securities in an iterative chain – prevented investors later 
in the securitization chain from calculating the risk they faced from losses 
on assets earlier in the chain.106   
The write-down of assets began to affect the creditworthiness, real and 
perceived, of many institutional investors.107  Many investors were forced to 
                                                                                                                           
Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/economy/krugman_subprime.fortun 
e/index.htm. 
 100 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Apr. 27, 2008, at 36.  
 101 Robert Stowe, Anatomy of a Meltdown, 68 MORTGAGE BANKING 38 (Oct. 1, 2007), available 
at 2007 WLNR 21537515; Greg B. Cioffi, Collateralized Damage, DAILY DEAL, Feb 1, 2008, available 
at 2008 WLNR 1910083. 
 102 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bond Insurer in Turmoil Turns to Familiar Lender, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 2008, at C2. 
 103 Shawn Tully, Risk Returns with a Vengeance, FORTUNE, Sept. 3, 2007, at 50. 
 104 Charles Duhigg, A Trickle that Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at C1 (report-
ing that major banks are writing down 20% to 50% of the value of their assets due to losses from mort-
gage-backed securities). 
 105 Louise Story, A Values Debate (Not the Political Kind), N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2008, at C1 
(reporting on debate over whether mark to market rule in Financial Accounting Statement 157 was 
leading to overstated  write downs); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2008, at C1.  
 106 Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Bear Bets Wrong, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 22, 2007, at 50 
(linking Bear Stearn’s deteriorating credit situation to the decline in value of “CDO squared” securities 
it held). 
 107 Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 2008, at A1 (describing contagious loss of investor and creditor confidence in U.S. investment 
banks). 
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sell asset-backed securities to improve their balance sheets,108 but they faced 
a liquidity risk problem similar to that of holders of mortgages; the initial 
depression of prices of asset-backed securities, combined with the volume 
of sellers in the market in the same predicament, sent the prices of these 
securities into a tailspin and dried up liquidity. 109 
Creditors, including stock lending and derivative counter-parties, be-
gan worrying about the credit risk posed by many institutions and made 
margin calls.110  Many large commercial and investment banks were forced 
to seek emergency equity infusions to shore up their balance sheets, reas-
sure creditors, and meet regulatory capital requirements.111  A few promi-
nent institutions failed in attempts to stay afloat.112  Threats to the solvency 
of financial institutions and hedge funds created fears of systemic risk due 
to domino effects.  The failure of one firm could trigger the collapse of oth-
er institutions because of the complex web of counter-party risk created by 
derivatives.113  Even perceived risk posed a threat; the contagion of deposi-
tor or creditor panic further exacerbated systemic risk.114  The failure or 
threat of failure to these large institutions prompted extraordinary federal 
intervention into financial markets. 
IV.  TWO MARKET IMPERFECTIONS: LENDER COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
CONSUMER BEHAVIORAL BIASES 
In the sketch of the subprime crisis above, three phenomena combined 
to exacerbate systemic risk:    
1.  a surge in consumer defaults due to increased consumer risk tak-
ing;115 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Liz Rappaport & Justin Lahart, Debt Reckoning: U.S. Receives a Margin Call, WALL. ST. J., 
Mar. 15, 2008, at A1.  
 109 E.g., Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Are Squeezed By Investors and Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 2007 at C1. 
 110 Id. 
 111 E.g., David Jolly, After Losses, UBS Seeks to Raise $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008 at 
C5; Eric Dash, IndyMac Announces It Will Close Lending Units and Cut Half of Its Work Force, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C3. 
 112 Goldstein & Henry, supra note 106 (reporting on bailout of Bear Stearns); Dash, supra note 
106 (reporting on insolvency of IndyMac Bank).  
 113 Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities 
Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL 15, 22 (Hal S. Scott ed., 
2005) (discussing systemic risk threat posed by securities firms by virtue of OTC derivatives activity). 
 114 Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 2007, at C1 (reporting that potential failure of Bear Stearns hedge fund raised investor concerns 
over systemic risk).  
 115 Crouhy et al., supra note 88.  
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2.  a failure by lenders and investors in asset-backed securities to pre-
dict these consumer defaults;116 and   
3.  a high correlation among consumer defaults.117 
In designing regulations to address these problems and mitigate the risk of 
future crises, regulators must grapple with multiple imperfections in the 
consumer lending markets.  Two imperfections or market failures warrant 
particular scrutiny.  First, consumer lenders face collective action failures in 
refraining from lending practices that may increase systemic risk.  Second, 
the ability of financial institutions to predict consumer defaults is compli-
cated by the fact that consumers may suffer behavioral biases.  
A.  “Predatory Lending” as a Commons Problem and Anti-coordination 
Game  
Each consumer lender, on its own, lacks sufficient incentives and abili-
ty to curtail lending practices that may exacerbate systemic risk.  Each 
lender has an incentive to maximize returns from its consumer borrowers 
and may be punished with lower market share for failing to do so.  But, 
these lending practices, when adopted by many lenders in the market, can 
lead to unpredictable, high, and highly correlated defaults by consumers.  
As noted above, waves of consumer defaults can threaten financial markets.  
This represents a classic collective action failure characterized by lenders 
that neither bear the full cost of their actions (i.e., their lending practices 
have negative externalities) nor are able to coordinate their actions with 
other lenders to refrain collectively from lending practices.118  The follow-
ing paragraphs present several versions of these problems. 
1.  A Consumer’s Wealth as Commons 
Each individual consumer represents a potential source of revenue for 
multiple lenders and, thus, resembles a classic commons.  Each lender can 
exploit the consumer and extract additional revenue, but the combination of 
several exploitative loans may cause the consumer to default.  Of course, 
lenders can protect themselves before extending a loan by examining the 
credit report of a borrower.  Credit reports typically contain information on 
the identity of other lenders, amount borrowed and payment history.119  But 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Gerding, supra note 12.  
 117 Coval et al., supra note 16.  
 118 Professor Schwarcz has characterized all efforts to mitigate systemic risk as a “commons 
problem.”  Schwarcz, supra note 5. 
 119 Robert B. Avery, Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, FED. RESERVE BULL. 297 
(Summer 2004) (detailing contents of consumer credit report), available at http://www.federalreserve.go 
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they lack detailed information on the terms of outstanding loans, and, as 
consumer law scholars have noted, the devil is in those details.  Consumer 
loan contracts can contain complicated interest rates, penalties or fee provi-
sions that could increase a consumer’s risk of default and, in severe cases, 
lead to insolvency.120  But, the complex and often bespoke nature of these 
contractual provisions would frustrate including information on them in a 
standard credit report.  One solution for this critical gap in information, 
which might be called the “consumer loan terms information gap,” is dis-
cussed below in Part V.A.  
2.  Homogenized or Synchronized Lending Practices and Correlated 
Consumer Defaults 
Lenders face a collective action problem not only with respect to indi-
vidual borrowers, but also with respect to groups of borrowers in the mar-
ket.  Lenders face a strong incentive to mimic lucrative lending practices –
from offering types of mortgages to including specific provisions in a credit 
card contract – that other lenders have used to extract value from, and trans-
fer risk to, consumers.121  But when these practices of different lenders be-
come highly homogenized or synchronized across the marketplace, con-
sumer defaults may become highly correlated as well, exacerbating system-
ic risk.  ARMs, and other exotic mortgages in the subprime provide a stark 
example of how homogenized lending practices that transfer increased risk 
to consumers can lead to correlated defaults.122   
                                                                                                                           
v/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_credit.pdf. 
 120 E.g. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1. 
 121 Cf. supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.  See Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, & 
Matthew S. Johnson, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, INITIATIVE ON BUSINESS & PUBLIC 
POLICY AT BROOKINGS: FIXING FINANCE SERIES - PAPER 3 14-19 (Nov. 2008), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan/11_origins_crisis
_baily_litan.pdf (positing a theory of mortgage originator behavior based on information cascades and 
bubble dynamics).  The authors of this Brookings study elaborate on how mortgage originators and 
other actors in the mortgage markets may have engaged in herd behavior. 
In a marketplace where individuals observe the actions of others, herding behavior may trump the 
judgment of rational individuals.  This kind of “social contagion” can go a long way in describing 
how homeowners, mortgage originators, holders of mortgage-backed securities, regulators, ratings 
agencies –indeed everyone – could get swept up in a bubble that ex post was clearly bound to 
burst.   
Id. at 16.  Cf. Raghuram G. Rajan, Why Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence, 
109 Q. J. ECON. 399-442 (1994) (presenting evidence of herding in bank lending standards).  
 122 The unfolding of the subprime crisis described in Part III.D above also demonstrates how 
consumer defaults can become even more highly correlated through spillover effects and feedback 
loops.  Spillover effects occur when the default on one consumer loan creates direct, negative externali-
ties that increase the probability that other consumers will also default.  For a lengthy discussion of the 
spillover effects that might lead to a high degree of correlation among consumer defaults and defaults on 
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B.  Consumer Unpredictability and Behavioral Biases 
A second type of economic imperfection further complicates the abili-
ty of consumer lenders and investors to predict consumer defaults.  To the 
extent that consumer behavioral biases play a significant role in consumer 
borrowing decisions,123 they also frustrate the ability of financial institutions 
to predict consumer behavior, including consumer defaults.  Behavioral 
economics has faced a trenchant criticism, prominently articulated in the 
legal literature by Professor Gregory Mitchell,124 that behavioral economics 
presents general tendencies but has yet to delineate the boundaries of those 
tendencies.125  In other words, behavioral economics produces evidence that 
behavioral biases occur but has not specified when those biases occur.126  
This failure to specify boundary conditions means that behavioral econom-
ics struggles to produce models of human behavior that can lead to testable 
predictions.127   
This criticism applies not only to the modeling of behavioral econom-
ics scholars but to the modeling used by financial institutions to predict 
consumer and investor behavior, as well.  Prediction of human behavior by 
financial institutions is frustrated by the lack of defined boundaries to beha-
vioral biases.  This lack of definition obscures the thresholds and magnitude 
of the effects of behavioral biases.  Thus, the higher the probability that a 
behavioral bias will be salient in a given context, the more uncertainty it 
adds to predictions by financial institutions of consumer behavior.128   
                                                                                                                           
asset-backed securities, see HELLWIG, supra note 14.  As one example of a spillover effect, data shows 
that a foreclosed house lowers the value of other houses in the neighborhood.  Adam Levitin, Resolving 
the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2009).  A precipitous drop in home value below the value of mortgages may induce other mortgage 
borrowers to default.  Feedback loops occur when consumer defaults trigger a series of events that can 
indirectly lead to a subsequent wave of defaults.  Part III.D gives the example of ARM defaults caused 
by rising interest rates, which leads to losses by financial institutions, who cut back lending, which leads 
to higher interest rates, which can lead to a new round of ARM defaults.   
 123 Supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.  
 124 See Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1797-99 (2003) (arguing that behavioral law and economics 
proponents have documented “tendencies” in behavioral biases, but has yet to specify the “boundaries” 
of those tendencies, i.e. when, and the extent to which, these biases come into play).  See also Richard 
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-60 
(1998) (faulting behavioral law and economics scholars for failing to offer a theory capable of generat-
ing testable predictions that would rival the predictive power of rational-choice economics). 
 125 Mitchell, supra note 124, at 1804-11. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 122-23 (2002). 
 128 Gerding, supra note 12. 
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In fact, evidence from the crisis suggests that even originating mort-
gage lenders who retained some portion of their loans (instead of securitiz-
ing all of those loans) struggled to predict consumer defaults.  Insolvencies 
and severe losses by mortgage lenders on mortgages that they retained or 
were unable to offload quickly enough129 suggest that mortgage originators 
severely miscalculated the level and timing of consumer defaults. 
V.   MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK THROUGH CONSUMER PROTECTION AND 
“MENU DESIGN” 
Consumer loans drove securitization and consumer defaults drove the 
financial crisis.  Part III provides a sketch of the chain that connected de-
faults on consumer mortgages with the collapse of major financial institu-
tions and threats to global financial markets.  This chain also underscores 
how adequate consumer financial laws can protect not only consumers from 
excessive risk, but markets from excessive systemic risk as well.  Mitigat-
ing systemic risk adds an altogether different justification for strong con-
sumer financial laws and vigorous enforcement of those laws.  Consumer 
financial protection is thus not only about protecting unsophisticated indi-
viduals – the proverbial “widows and orphans” – from risky loans but about 
protecting financial markets as well.130   
Consumer protection regulations that promoted some mix of the fol-
lowing objectives would have mitigated both systemic risk and the severity 
of the current crisis:  
1.  lowering the incidence of consumer defaults; 
2.  making consumer defaults more predictable to lenders and in-
vestors in asset-backed securities; and 
3.  reducing the correlation of consumer defaults. 
Consumer financial laws could promote these various objectives and ad-
dress systemic risk by working at either end of the securitization chain – by 
                                                                                                                           
 129 John Kiff & Paul S. Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in  
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets (IMF, Working Paper 07-188, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
External/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf. 
 130 U.S. bank regulators seem to be very tentatively recognizing the connection between consumer 
protection and safety-and-soundness.  Notably, in 2006, the Federal Reserve and other federal bank 
regulators issued guidance that suggested to financial institutions that they both make enhanced disclo-
sures to consumers who borrow under exotic mortgages and adopt enhanced underwriting standards for 
such mortgages.  These recommendations were based on both consumer protection and safety-and-
soundness objectives.  See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Interagency Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58, 609 (Oct. 4, 2006).  However, this guidance 
was non-binding.    
2009] Subprime Crisis - Consumer Fin. Protection & Systemic Risk 117 
 
directly addressing the provision of loans to consumers or by regulating the 
market for asset-backed securities backed by consumer loans.131   
Most directly, consumer financial protections could address the first 
objective – lowering the incidence of consumer default – by ensuring that 
consumers do not take on excessive risk.  To accomplish this, regulators 
could use the traditional tools of consumer financial protection outlined in 
Part II.A – enhanced disclosure to consumers on the risks posed by loans 
and substantive regulation to prohibit certain interest rates or other loan 
provisions.132  But these traditional tools have downsides.  It is questionable 
whether additional boilerplate disclosure alone would change the behavior 
of consumers.  Restricting or prohibiting certain types of mortgages and 
other consumer contracts might raise the cost of credit to consumers or, for 
some consumers, foreclose access to credit altogether.133      
A.  “Menu Design” 
A promising alternative approach to consumer financial protection 
based on behavioral economic research offers to both improve consumer 
decision-making on risk and make those decisions – and thus the likelihood 
of consumer default – more predictable.  Scholars have proposed rules that 
address the design of “menus” of contractual choices available to consum-
ers in order to mitigate the risk that behavioral biases will lead consumers 
to unwise decisions.134  These rules would not necessarily prevent consum-
ers from entering into unfavorable transactions.  Rather menu design pro-
posals focus on how information is presented to individuals.135  Moreover, 
carefully crafted default rules (including well designed opt-in and opt-out 
provisions) might counteract or harness the behavioral biases of consum-
                                                                                                                           
 131 Several scholars have argued that consumer protection could also be addressed through regulat-
ing the market for asset-backed securities backed by consumer loans.  See Engel & McCoy, supra note 
83; Peterson, supra note 83. 
 132 In other words, regulators could clarify and strengthen the standards in the Interagency Guid-
ance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks ,see supra note 130, and make them binding. 
 133 See Gregory Elliehausen & Michael Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An 
Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 29 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 411, 429-30 
(2004) (finding a 1999 North Carolina statute prohibiting certain “predatory” mortgages caused lenders 
to sharply restrict lending to high risk borrowers and arguing against this restricted access to credit). 
On the other hand, pricing some high credit risk consumers out of the market might lower interest rates 
for more credit-worthy consumers who might be “subsidizing” riskier borrowers by paying higher 
interest rates.   
 134 See generally Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 11-13 (2006).    
 135 Id.  
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ers.136  Better menu design would dissuade consumers from agreeing to loan 
provisions that pose excessive risk.   
A full discussion of possible regulations to address the menu design of 
consumer mortgages and other loan contracts is beyond the scope of this 
article.  Nevertheless, the following is a sketch of one regulatory scheme for 
redesigning the contractual menu for consumer mortgages.  Regulation 
might require that, as a default rule, all residential mortgages shall have a 
fixed interest rate.  A consumer could opt for a floating rate mortgage only 
after he or she has received disclosures on the risk the consumer faces 
should interest rates rise.  This disclosure could leverage behavioral biases 
to make consumers focus on this risk.  For example, disclosure could take 
advantage of the availability bias by giving consumers salient statistics on 
default, foreclosure and bankruptcy rates increase for consumers who opt 
for floating rate mortgages.  To ensure that consumers mentally process the 
disclosure, regulations could require that consumers copy important disclo-
sure passages in their own handwriting.  Additional opt-in provisions and 
disclosure could be required for consumers to be bound by more complex 
floating rate provisions.  Of course, some high-risk provisions could be 
outright prohibited. 
Menu design would not only reduce the probability of consumers tak-
ing on excessive risk, it would also make their decision-making more pre-
dictable.  This would enable lenders and investors to calculate better the 
risk of consumer default.  By lowering the risk of unpredictable and highly 
correlated consumer default, these provisions would also mitigate systemic 
risk.  Menu-design proposals would have another benefit for addressing 
systemic risk by encouraging more standardization in consumer loan con-
tracts, which would address the “consumer loan terms information gap” 
mentioned above.  Again, lenders considering extending a loan to a con-
sumer may be concerned that the consumer’s existing loan contracts may 
contain complex, fine print provisions that increase the risk of the borrower 
defaulting on multiple loans.  Standardization would provide a way of cate-
gorizing these provisions so that they could appear on more nuanced credit 
reports.137   
                                                                                                                           
 136 See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymo-
ron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).    
 137 Of course this assumes that loan officers would take sufficient care to examine credit reports or 
that credit reporting agencies would factor this added level of information into a credit score.  
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B.  Alternative Explanations: What If Financial Institutions Had Greater 
Information on the Risk of Consumer Default?  
Nevertheless, policies designed to provide lenders and investors with 
additional information about consumer default risk may be insufficient; it is 
questionable whether some lenders and investors would refrain from invest-
ing in high-risk consumer loans even with enhanced information about the 
risk of those loans.138  Scholars have argued that managers at lenders and 
institutional investors took on excessive risk with respect to consumer loans 
and asset-backed securities backed by those loans because of misaligned 
incentives between these managers and the institution’s shareholders and 
creditors; poorly designed executive compensation figures prominently in 
this explanation.139  Executives at financial institutions may have faced 
pressure not to resist the herd mentality of financial institutions that drove 
subprime lending and propelled asset-backed security prices higher; 140 it is 
a career risk to bet against a bubble.  In addition, even executives and so-
phisticated traders at financial institutions may be subject to the same types 
of behavioral biases that afflict consumers.141  Agency costs and behavioral 
biases may combine to induce individuals at financial institutions to invest 
in risky consumer debt even when they are armed with better information 
on the risks involved.  This argues that consumer financial laws may play a 
necessary role in mitigating systemic risk by restricting consumer lending 
practices that lead to excessive and highly correlated consumer defaults. 
                                                                                                                           
 138 The global financial crisis stemmed from multiple failures of markets and regulations; one 
alternative policy prescription – that investors in securitizations primarily need better information about 
the risks associated with assets underlying securities – has gained particular traction among policymak-
ers and scholars.  For example, many proposals focus on improving the quality of rating agency ratings.  
See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk after the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for 
Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (2009).  
 139 See Executive Compensation II: CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (Mar. 7 2008) (Testimony of Dr. Susan M. 
Wachter, Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management, Professor of Real Estate and Finance, 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20 
080307103022.pdf. 
 140 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and Credit Crunch, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 77, 82 (2009).  Professor Brunnermeier cites the now infamous quote by Citigroup CEO 
Charles Prince: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.  But as long as 
the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.  We’re still dancing.”  Id. 
 141 See, e.g., Robert A. Olsen, Implications of Herding Behavior for Earnings Estimation, Risk 
Assessment, and Stock Returns, FIN. ANALYSTS J. 39-40 (July/Aug. 1996) (finding that expert financial 
analysts engage in herding). 
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VI.   INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS: THE REDESIGN OF THE FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The third objective of mitigating systemic risk posed by consumer 
loans – reducing the correlation of consumer defaults – might be addressed 
in part by focusing on the institutional design of consumer regulation.  
Choosing which regulator is responsible for consumer financial protection 
(i.e. regulating how much risk is transferred to consumers by consumer 
loans) can affect both the potential for highly correlated consumer defaults 
and systemic risk more generally.   
A.  Federal Preemption and Homogenized Lending Practices 
Correlated consumer defaults resulted in large part from the growth of 
ARMs and consumer loan practices that transferred excessive risk to con-
sumers.  The problem was not merely that these products and practices in-
creased the default risk, but that they also became widespread as consumer 
lender behavior became increasingly homogenized and synchronized.  The 
proliferation of ARMs and subprime lending in general was enabled by 
several legal changes described above that expanded federal preemption of 
state consumer protection laws.  For example, Marquette National Bank 
permitted national banks to export the usury law of the state in which they 
are located.142  The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act reinforced this decision by preempting certain state interest rate 
caps.143   Federal preemption of state consumer financial protection accele-
rated with the recent Watters decision144 and positions taken by the OCC.145  
Reversing these various decisions and allowing states to set different levels 
of consumer protection for borrowers located in their jurisdiction – regard-
less of where the lender is located or chartered – would reduce the level of 
homogeneity of lender practices and could reduce correlations (at least in-
terstate) of consumer defaults.   
B.  Notes on Federal Reform Proposals  
On the federal level, the link between consumer financial protection 
and systemic risk also has important implications for the current debate on 
redesigning the institutional framework for financial regulation in the Unit-
ed States (as well as in other countries).  The global financial crisis has 
sparked calls for dramatically reorganizing the responsibilities of financial 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See supra notes 26-28, 26-28 and accompanying text. 
 143 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.    
 144 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.  
 145 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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regulators.  Scholars and policymakers have called variously for a single 
financial regulator or for a new financial regulator that would oversee all 
systemic risk regulation.146  Alternatively, the “Twin Peaks” model would 
split regulatory responsibility in two;147 a consumer regulator would oversee 
consumer financial protection,148 and a separate regulator would address the 
safety and soundness of financial institutions.149 
Arguments for the Twin Peaks model and against a single financial 
regulator include that the consumer financial protection and systemic risk 
regulation are missions that require different expertise.150  Moreover, plac-
ing these two missions under the same regulatory umbrella might allow the 
agency to bow to political pressure and subtly favor one mission over the 
other.  As Professor Levitin notes, public choice theory suggests that con-
sumer financial protection is likely to end up on the losing side of that fight.  
When conflicts arise on a consumer protection regulation, a smaller number 
of financial institutions with a high stake in lower regulation would exercise 
more political muscle than a diffuse band of less-informed and less-
organized consumers.151       
The connections explored in this Article between consumer financial 
protection and systemic risk demonstrate the need, at the very least, for 
heavy coordination between a consumer financial regulator and a systemic 
risk regulator.  But, public choice theory again suggests that the consumer 
financial regulator may lose in the inevitable interagency conflicts or oth-
erwise be hobbled in carrying out its mission.  Moreover, a systemic risk 
regulator may miss the subtle connections between consumer protection 
and systemic risk.  The potential for regulators to give inadequate consider-
ation to consumer protection objectives argues for statutory provisions that 
give extra weight to consumer financial protection regulations vis-á-vis 
perceived conflicts with safety and soundness regulations.   
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Editorial, It’s the Regulations, Not the Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A30 
(criticizing calls for single financial regulator or systemic risk regulator).    
 147 See Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Finan-
cial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 237 (2007) 
(surveying European nation approaches to division of financial regulatory authority).  
 148 For scholarly proposals for the creation of a federal regulator with consolidated responsibility 
for consumer financial protection, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 1; Heidi M. Schooner, Structuring 
the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43 (2005).   
 149 A third alternative would be to have three regulators: one responsible for stability of financial 
markets, a second responsible for prudential regulation, and a third for business conduct of financial 
firms (including consumer protection). U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT OF A MODERNIZED 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 137 (Mar. 2008). 
 150 For a policy analysis of the tradeoffs among the Twin Peaks, single regulator and functional 
regulatory models, see Eric J. Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation: The Case of Canada, 
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 250 (Jan. 2009).  
 151 Levitin, supra note 9. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
The subprime crisis has demonstrated the need to see protection of 
consumers from excessively risky credit products as a fundamental tool for 
mitigating systemic risk.  This additional role for consumer protection adds 
to the quiver of policymakers, scholars, and advocates who have been con-
cerned with diluted and under-enforced consumer financial laws.   
This Article attempts to sketch the connection between consumer pro-
tection and systemic risk and to begin to draw out some of the substantive 
and institutional regulatory implications of this connection.  Several key 
avenues for research remain, including the following: 
 
  Considering whether ongoing consolidation in the financial 
sector will further increase correlations in consumer defaults; 
  Further investigating consumer default correlations and their 
causes, particularly during the subprime crisis; 
  Fleshing out how menu-design may address behavioral biases 
in consumer credit decisions, make consumer behavior more 
predictable, and protect consumers;  
   Analyzing whether particular state laws were effective in re-
ducing consumer defaults in subprime markets or making de-
faults less correlated; and  
  Studying whether consumer protection laws would drive fi-
nancial institutions out of a broad class of investments under-
mining diversification by those institutions.   
 
The overhaul of U.S. financial regulation may not wait for definitive an-
swers to all these open research questions.  Nevertheless, regulators and 
scholars must not ignore the vital role that consumer financial protection 
plays in mitigating systemic risk.  
 
